Who will guard us from the guards?

Nikola Dujovski

Security sector reform, triggered by unlawful interception of communications and political consequences, triggering extraordinary parliamentary elections, should reflect the social reality and provide space for the development of all other state sectors. How much these services impact society is seen in the fact that the remnants of the regime, for a long time, succeeded in hindering the formation of a new government, culminating in the occurrence of one of the most serious crimes on April 27, 2017.

Immediately after the current Government came to power, a working group of prominent professionals, university professors, representatives from the NGO sector was formed, representatives of the international community were involved, and there was an extensive public debate on this set of laws. Thus, laws that regulate the monitoring of communications were prepared and the new Operational Technical Agency was established and became operational on November 1, 2018. In addition, the Law on Interception of Communications, as well as the Amendments and Supplements to the Law on Police and Internal Affairs, were adopted in order to comply with the provisions of the many amendments to various laws.

The initial information on the integrity of OTA has relaxed the relations between the various institutions, and over time, it will restore the trust of the citizens in the system. The professional public, mostly, is convinced that illegal tracking of communications – at least by the state authorities – does not exist, but the question remains whether someone else, outside the state authorities, owns such equipment and monitors communications. There is no information that the state authorities have taken serious measures to find out whether and how someone else is still wiretapping  the citizens.

The second “big” reform is the reform of the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate. The Law on the National Security Agency and the Law on Co-ordination of the Security and Intelligence Community were enacted, with more than 90 MPs. Thus, the ANB will be outside the Ministry of Interior, there will be no police powers and will be under the vigilant control of the Parliament, the civil sector and the Ombudsman. The ANB is “acquitted” of deprivation of liberty or the issuing of orders and guidelines for taking police powers, and instead they will monitor, analyze and propose measures for the security of the state, in coordination with other security institutions.

Part of the public emphasizes the influence of the Government, that is, the Prime Minister, in proposing and election of the Director of the National Security Agency and other security services, and the minorization of the President of the State in the field of security, although the law adopts a lot of control mechanisms.

The third “reform” refers to the reform of public security. In this segment there are serious developments forward, especially in the part of the organization of the police and coordination with other departments in dealing with more serious security challenges, organization and conduct of elections, etc.

However, it can not yet be said that in the Ministry of Interior, objective procedures for police actions have been constructed, which will not be subject to political or other influences, especially with election related acts.

Other security services are still in the process of scanning their functionality and operability, as is the case with the Crisis Management Center and the Protection and Rescue Directorate, and special laws are expected soon.

As much as we reform the security sector, the results will be pale and temporary, unless the real fight against crime starts. The mentioned reforms go well, but they will not seriously strengthen the confidence in the system. To date, we have not seen a more serious fight against economic crime and against the financial abuses of current and former officials. The “culture of illegal services” continued to be the practice of the new government, and thus, “in the game” remain people for whom there are indications of serious crimes.

A bright point in this regard is the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, which for the time being proves to be non-selective in its actions and appropriately fulfills its legal powers, but without proper cooperation and action of other state bodies, such activity can very soon be stifled. The emphasis in the forthcoming period should be placed on the more serious coordination between the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the police services in the processing of acts for which it is easy to find evidence and which the SCPC points out.

A particularly important step will be the long-promised “vetting” of the employees in the security sector and it must apply not only to the newly employed, but also to all those active in the services. The conceptual definition of this issue is expected for an unreasonably long time, although this is a very serious process, which can have strong implications. It’s high time to ask the question “Who will guard us from the guards?”

The fact that citizens expect much more from the fight against crime and the protection of the state budget is undisputed, but there are no significant results either from the regular prosecutor’s office or from the SPO.

If we want to talk about a stable security sector, it can in no way only mean legal changes and interception of communications. Much more, such reforms should introduce resistance of institutions of political or business influence. This will enable building of the whole system and preparing the country for the negotiations for EU membership.

Unfortunately, for the time being, in the Republic of Northern Macedonia, this has not been done.

(The author is the Dean of the Faculty of Security, and the column is part of the project “Childhood Diseases of Democracy”, supported and financed by the NED, and in the implementation of the AGTIS.)