The loud silence of the “Colorful”


Petar Arsovski

I think that rather than politicians wondering and suspecting the reasons why the representatives of the “Colorful Revolution” have now appeared, they better ask themselves why they did not vote in the first round of elections. The answer to this question is important mostly because representatives of the “Colorful Revolution” are representatives of those voters who change governments and political elites, and thus their attitude towards politicians is indicative of the attitude of the undecided voters to the political situation in general.
Namely, party cores are established, unchangeable categories, and they will support the party line regardless of the quality of the party product (the narrative and the candidates). If we take the last few election cycles, those party cores are relatively close, equal. But these undecided voters, so-called swing voters, are exactly that small tab on the scale that in this political context decides which party will win. Paradoxically, although these voters carry most of the decision, most often the party headquarters give them the least attention. Thus, rallies, advertisements, and main narratives are most often or intended for their own party supporters (whose votes the parties have already won), or for party opponents (whose votes are certainly lost), and for the undecided ones (which I would call crucial votes), there is not much left in the campaign.
Who are these voters, what are their opinions and what are the messages they are sending to the political elites? Undecided or crucial voters are by definition voters who do not belong to a political party, but to a value ideological matrix. This means that they vote for the party or candidate who at the time of the elections represent their values ​​in the way that is closest to them. Thus, at one time, according to the political “product” they might choose one party or candidate, and in the next elections they could choose another option, or if they are dissatisfied with the overall political offer, stay at home and refuse to vote. The parties would like to think that there are no substantially crucial votes, because it is so much easier. For the winner (the one to whom those voters have leaned at the moment) it is easier to conclude that these are permanent votes that would merge with the faithful party voters, and so they are often neglected after the election victory. For the losers (from whom these voters fled at a given moment) it is easier to present them as an instrument of the opposition or some foreign powers, as an attempt to avoid sincere introspection of their own weaknesses. Thus, we treat crucial voters (in this case, the so-called “Colorful Revolution”) as exploited votes, but I think that the latest results in the presidential elections show that they are not party supporters and represent an authentically critical core. This conclusion, although it might be bad news for the political parties, is good news for democracy.
For instance, low turnout and low level of support for the two presidential candidates show that these voters are not “owned” by anyone. Then, they are a good indication of what the critical public thinks about the bids of most parties, but also about the direction in which our society should move in the future. First of all, instead of presidential candidates that distance from their party cores, the parties completely drowned them in their narrative, and thus the two favorites lost a significant part of the critical public. The fact that the SDSM presidential candidate did not win a lot of those votes is an indicator that the critical public is dissatisfied with the way in which the government exercises power and that major topics for NATO and the EU are not enough to maintain a high level of support. The message is that if essential reforms of the rule of law are not made, the reform of the administration and the way of delivering the services to the citizens; if the economy and social protection are not corrected, that the EU / NATO mantra is not sufficient and that voters have little patience for the “sweep” promised by Zoran Zaev. In other words, it is not enough that the compass of the government is set to a good direction if it does not move in that direction. At the same time, the low level of support for the opposition candidate is proof that the “Colorful” think that the opposition’s compass is still not set to a good direction. If the opposition does not make a substantial internal reform, if it does not accept the new course of the country, and does not become more pro-Western and less Albanian-phobic, they should not hope for much of the votes of the undecided voters.
The messages within the Albanian camp are even sharper: the low level of turnout and the rejection of the current political elites are an indication that DUI is in serious trouble, but that the opposition is not very accepted by the Albanian voters. I think that analyzes that claim that Albanian voters reject a joint candidate and that it means it is too early for the failed concept of cross-ethnic inclusiveness, and a so-called “consensus”. I think that voters essentially have no problem with the concept of a coalition candidate, but with the overall quality of the coalition itself.
At the same time, I think that the Albanian opposition, already in the second round of the presidential elections, will understand that it is too early to count their votes for their candidate as their party votes, and that the calculations with those votes for some subsequent political maneuvers are not appropriate.
In the end, the behavior of all political parties after the first round shows that they also received the messages from the voters. Siljanovska-Davkova is suddenly a “very big” supporter of the EU and NATO, suddenly the Prespa Agreement turned out to be a legal fact, and the like. Pendarovski and SDSM suddenly promoted the “sweep,” planning to clean and reform the ruling coalition. DUI is suddenly enthusiastic about the number of votes that the party “will deliver” for the second election round. We will see whether all of this is a pre-election mantra or essential understanding of the dynamics of the needs of the political market.
Views expressed in this article are personal views of the author and do not represent the editorial policy of Nezavisen Vesnik