The little picture


Petar Arsovski

Most of the analyzes that focus on the name dispute can be divided into two categories. The ones who say that it is a done deal, and the ones who say that there is no chance. I think there are several logical errors that bind to both approaches.

The first error is that the severity of the situation, the urgency of the problem and the gloomy alternatives somehow affect the resolution. It is true that if this decade’s problem is not solved, Macedonia and the region will move in a dramatically wrong, and even worse direction. But that fact does not in any way increase the likelihood of a good name solution. The second error is to assume that due to the fact that (as official information says) we have solved 80 percent of the points of disagreement, that the remaining 20 percent will go fast. And it’s also a wrong analogy. First, the last 20 percent of the solution may require 80 percent of the effort, and the interconnectedness of the solutions can confirm the diplomatic paradigm that until it is agreed, nothing is agreed. Therefore, we should not be so optimistic.

On the other hand, those who say that there will be no solution, forget that the public in Macedonia is relatively tired of the issue and relatively prepared for compromises, and that the public in Greece (with the exception of the northern part of the country) is relatively uninformed and only superficially interested, so if there is political will there is room for a breakthrough.

And so, while geostrategic displacements take place, the domestic issues remain. The first is whether the SDSM DUI coalition will survive, if there are more serious problems in the adoption of the law on languages. I think it will be very difficult at this point to break up that story especially that in the majority of the public, DUI would be the biggest culprit for such a breakup. Zaev seems fair at the moment: he shows all signs that he is ready to push through this law that comes out of the political need of his coalition partner, but the problem at the moment is ineligible political dynamics. Moreover, the attempt that SDSM made for consensus with VMRO-DPMNE really convinced the public that Zaev did everything he could on that issue, and the threat of the coalition would certainly be interpreted as a political debacle of DUI, and perhaps even of their own voters who still consider it more important to resolve the name dispute (on which Zaev is most focused), than to adopt the law on languages.

The second dilemma is whether Zaev delivers enough to maintain his political position and capital, bearing in mind that the long political limbo promptly activates parties’ ambitions for a new parliamentary majority or early elections. I think Zaev is still in a good position, at least relatively. More precisely: Zaev faces disappointment and a worse political situation, than before the local elections, but VMRO-DPMNE is in a worse situation, with a shaky party base, with part of the membership that is under attack by structures rather than the new party leadership , impaired image, unconsolidated leadership, and incomplete re-branding. Therefore, I do not believe that Zaev may have some major political surprises in the near future. On the contrary, I think that the situation, at least from an authoritarian political character, is under his control. His biggest problem is his own supporters, who, honestly, are not satisfied with the speed of the implementation of the changes, but would never even think about voting for another option, if it comes to that.

Therefore, at this moment, most problematic, in the political sense, are the allegations that the connection between politics and the underground is still active, that VMRO-DPMNE is trying to create a network of informants and saboteurs within the institutions, and that foreign forces are activated more seriously in an attempt to prevent the name dispute and the breakthrough towards Euro-Atlantic integrations. This is the one that should not worry in the right way, because it shows that we are again in the focus of any violations between Washington and Moscow, which is certainly a problematic news for us, given that Moscow’s interest in the region seems to be stronger. The question is whether US interest will wake up fast enough at a high enough level, in order to intervene in this “photo finish”.
Domestic turbulence and turmoil are, in essence, normal. We should expect that a system that has been repressed in the wrong way during the last decade will not change overnight, and that the previous corrupt and clientelist structures will resist changes. This should not worry us too much, because that resistance, as long as it exists, means that things are moving in the right direction. I would worry when the opposition becomes silent, which would mean that there is no progress. Then there would be a real danger that, while looking at the big picture, the small picture might get ruined.