Not even the Przino model of the SEC is chic
Aleksandra M. Mitevska
If something in Macedonia proves to be unsustainable to the test of time, regardless of the political circumstances at the given moment, it is certainly the election regulations, including the election administration concept.
There were almost no elections in the country that were not preceded by “major and thorough” reforms of electoral legislation, which are of such size and depth barely sustained until the next election. Or until the first shift to the head position of one of the biggest parties.
So this time, the dialogue between the Prime Minister and SDSM leader Zoran Zaev, with the new opposition leader, Hristijan Mickoski, basically started from the possibility of amending the Electoral Code. From this, at least, the constructiveness in their relations began to stagger after the Prime Minister agreed to abandon the latest concept of the State Election Commission, which was long and widely agreed and conceived during the negotiations in Przino.
But what was reconciled to the meetings between the collaborators of the opposition Zaev and Nikola Gruevski, as the leader of a ruling party, at the EU residence in Skopje, apparently has no weight in the Prime Minister’s meetings with Mickoski in the government. After only two election cycles in two consecutive years, conducted under the Przino Regulation, part of the then agreed novelties in the Electoral Code are now on the way to become also part of the political history.
The reason for this is probably not, or at least not, logical to be the scandal with the high fees that went into the SEC at the end of last year. Indeed, a similar case was observed in the previous composition of the Commission, before the change of its concept, that is, before the involvement of experts in it. The difference is that the event that followed after the elections in 2014 did not get as much scandalous dimensions as the public, for both the then-members of the election commission must have resign one by one and move to apanage, as their successors did a few months ago.
This comparison between the last two compositions of the commissions in fact shows that the (diss)functionality of this body is not so much a question of a concept or political agreement, but (the absence) of political consciousness and of the selection made by the parties, nominating mainly inadequate and incompetent staff. They, however, then decide the most often party, instead of legally, and their mutual interest, regardless of all the quarrels on the stage and their various political jerseys, is to make additional subsidies, despite the already high incomes, given that their engagements are mainly concentrated on elections. Therefore, the idea of the SEC functioning in the future as an administrative body, whose members will be put into action six months before the elections, is valid. But as long as it comes to this, the old SEC model is returned to the scene with a new opposition leader at its helm.
From this aspect, it is much more likely that the main reason for the announced changes in the way the SEC operates is, in fact, the change in the roles of the main actors on the political scene. What suited Gruevski, while his party was in power – the SEC to be managed by experts, does not suit Mickoski, as the leader of the opposition. It would be much better for him if one of his men led the Commission.
That is why the issue of new changes in the election regulation is now open, although this is not the most important issue in the world, during the reform process for achieving the Euro-Atlantic criteria. It is also difficult to expect that the announced changes in the electoral rules will significantly influence the improvement of the next election processes in the country. This can really happen only if more substantial reforms are taken in the area of protection against abuse in the financing of campaigns and in the electoral model, as would be, for instance, the introduction of open lists, which, as a result, the leaderships the biggest parties escape from the fire.
Until then, the electoral legislation in the country will function according to the principle “all flows, all changes”. Each new leader of a political party and each new head of government will continue to have its own claims regarding the election rules. Perhaps only the observations of the OSCE-ODIHR and the domestic observers about the voting and the weaknesses in the functioning of the election administration remain constant.